Salary sits at the heart of most divorce disputes, yet it is also one of the most misunderstood elements of financial remedy proceedings. People often assume the court will simply split income down the middle, or that a high-earning spouse will automatically be ordered to support a lower-earning one indefinitely. Neither assumption is accurate. The rules governing how salary and income are assessed in England and Wales are more precise, more contextual, and in several respects, more demanding of both parties than people expect.
The framework has not changed since 1973. Section 25 of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 requires the court to consider all the circumstances of the case, with first consideration given to the welfare of any minor children. Among the specific factors listed, income sits at the top: the court must have regard to the income, earning capacity, property and other financial resources which each party has or is likely to have in the foreseeable future.
That phrase, "likely to have in the foreseeable future," carries significant weight. The court is not restricted to a payslip. It can look at potential earnings, career trajectory, professional qualifications, and deliberate underemployment. A spouse who has reduced their hours or taken a lower-paid role since proceedings began may find the court attributes a higher income to them than their current position reflects.
One of the more contested questions in financial remedy cases is how courts treat earning capacity, as distinct from actual earnings. The distinction matters both for the division of capital and for maintenance.
On the capital side, the Court of Appeal confirmed in Waggott v Waggott [2018] that earning capacity is not a matrimonial asset subject to the sharing principle. A spouse cannot claim a portion of the other’s future salary on the basis that their earning power was developed during the marriage. The court held that income generated after separation results from post-separation effort, and to treat it as a shared resource would fundamentally undermine the clean break principle.
The position is different for maintenance. There, earning capacity is directly relevant, and the court examines it from both sides. It will assess whether the paying spouse can genuinely afford the sums sought, and whether the receiving spouse is making reasonable efforts to generate their own income. Courts have become markedly less tolerant of a recipient who shows little inclination to return to work. In one widely reported case, a judge criticised a wife for being evasive about her own earning capacity and ordered a phased reduction in payments, noting that the working world offered considerable possibilities.
Disclosure requires complete transparency. Basic salary, overtime, commission, bonuses, share options, dividends and benefits in kind all fall within the scope of what must be declared. Future changes, including known promotions or anticipated redundancies, must also be disclosed. A spouse who conceals or downplays income will be operating in dangerous territory; courts draw adverse inferences from inadequate disclosure and have shown willingness to penalise non-disclosure heavily.
Where one spouse is employed and the other is not, the court does not treat the employed spouse’s salary as permanently available to fund two households at the same level. The analysis begins with needs. What does each party require to meet reasonable living costs? Only after that assessment does the court consider how income should be deployed.
Salary income typically feeds into periodical payments, the formal term for ongoing maintenance. These can take several forms. A term order fixes payments for a set period, often two to five years, and is the preferred modern approach where the recipient has the capacity to achieve financial independence. A joint lives order runs until death or remarriage of either party and is increasingly rare. A nominal order, set at a token figure such as five pence per year, preserves the right to apply for substantive maintenance later if circumstances change.
The Duxbury calculation is used in higher-value cases to capitalise maintenance. It produces the lump sum that, invested prudently, would generate enough income to meet the recipient’s needs for the rest of their life. Capitalisation allows both parties to achieve a clean break rather than maintaining an ongoing financial relationship.
Maintenance terminates automatically on the recipient’s remarriage. Cohabitation with a new partner does not have the same automatic effect, but courts will examine the financial contribution of the new partner to the recipient’s household when deciding whether variation is appropriate.
In December 2024, the Law Commission published its scoping report on financial remedies law in England and Wales, concluding that the existing framework fails to deliver consistent or accessible outcomes. The report identified maintenance as one of the areas most in need of reform, noting the absence of any clear statutory principle governing how long payments should run or at what level.
The government has not yet responded, and the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 remains the operative law. But the report signals a direction of travel toward greater certainty, and parties negotiating settlements now should be aware that the legal landscape may shift during the course of lengthy proceedings. Specialist advice at an early stage becomes more, not less, important in a period of potential reform.
Income does not exist in isolation from the rest of a financial remedy case. A high-earning spouse who receives a larger share of assets may face a reduced maintenance obligation precisely because capital can be deployed to generate income. Equally, a lower-earning spouse awarded the family home may find their maintenance needs recalculated to reflect the implicit housing benefit they now enjoy.
Vardags acts exclusively for high net worth and ultra high net worth clients in cases where salary and income sit alongside complex asset portfolios, making the interplay between these elements particularly pronounced.
The rules around salary and income in divorce are designed to achieve fairness, not equality of outcome. What a court orders will depend on facts that no formula can predict. Length of marriage, contributions made, the realistic earning potential of both parties, and the needs of any children will all shape the result. Understanding how the system approaches income is the first step to knowing what a fair outcome looks like.
A: Not automatically. Courts do not divide salary as an asset. Salary is relevant to the level of any maintenance order and to the overall financial picture, but your spouse cannot claim ownership of future earnings. The Court of Appeal confirmed in Waggott v Waggott [2018] that earning capacity is not subject to the sharing principle that applies to matrimonial property.**
A: Yes. If there is a significant disparity in income and one party cannot meet their reasonable needs without support, the court can make a periodical payments order. The amount will be based on the recipient’s needs and the payer’s ability to pay, not on a fixed percentage of either party’s salary.**
A: Either party can apply to vary a maintenance order if there is a material change in circumstances. A significant increase in the recipient’s income, or a substantial decrease in the payer’s, are both grounds for variation. The court will reassess needs and resources at the time of the application.
A: No. Courts now favour time-limited orders that encourage financial independence. A joint lives order, which runs indefinitely, is increasingly uncommon. In most cases the court will set a term, after which payments cease, unless the recipient applies for an extension before expiry.**
A: All of it. Salary, bonuses, commission, overtime, dividends, rental income, share options, benefits in kind, pension contributions and expected future income must all be declared on Form E. Incomplete or misleading disclosure can lead to adverse inferences being drawn and can result in orders being set aside at a later date.
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